These elections are of vital importance for the future of AMLO’s 4T Transformation of the country’s affairs, and opinion polls indicate that his Morena party is likely to win a large majority of the positions being contested.

But the opposition, or to be more precise the old guard which has controlled Mexico for decades, is determined to prevent such a victory and is using every trick in the book to prevent free and honest elections.

A corrupt election referee

In common with most countries, Mexico has an official body to supervise elections, like the Electoral Commission in the UK: the National Electoral Institute (INE by its Spanish initials). Indeed, INE is larger and has greater powers than similar bodies in many other countries.

But this is far from guaranteeing free and fair elections, indeed the country is notorious for ballot-rigging and corruption of all kinds. AMLO and Morena only won the 2018 elections by a massive popular movement coupled with unprecedented organisation and vigilance at the polls.

The reason for this is that for decades INE has been stacked with placemen whose only purpose is to guarantee continued domination by the establishment PRI and PAN parties and the corrupt elite they represent.

The current Chair of INE, Lorenzo Córdova, has a salary of 178,000 pesos ($8,900 US) per month, roughly 60% more than AMLO. This despite a law passed by the Mexican Congress after AMLO slashed his own salary by 50%, which also specifies that no public official can earn more than the President. Both Córdova and Ciro Murayama, one of his main pals at INE, obtained injunctions to prevent the salary cap being applied to them.

With its bloated and overpaid staff, INE is probably – according to AMLO – the most expensive electoral commission in the world.¹ It is without doubt one of the least impartial.

In recent months INE, led by Córdova and Murayama, has tried to silence AMLO´s morning press conferences. These hugely popular events are the President’s main vehicle of publicity in the face of an overwhelmingly hostile media. INE was unable to shut them down, but they did succeed in imposing a gagging order which forbids AMLO from expressing partisan opinions or promoting governmental programmes during the official two-month campaign period.

While some restriction on executive intervention in election campaigns is normal, what INE has imposed on AMLO is clearly excessive and has produced rather comic results in which the President not only refuses to comment on partisan disputes (even in his own party), but carries out routine visits to public institutions in semi-clandestine fashion without publicity.

When publicly attacked by the opposition, AMLO now responds by criticising “the conservatives”, avoiding INE’s ban on partisan comments since there is no party with that name officially registered in Mexico.

Arbitrary disqualification of progressive candidates

While this shadow-boxing has its comic side, the right-wing agenda of the INE directors is deadly serious. In recent weeks they have disqualified quite a number of Morena candidates (49 at last count), including gubernatorial candidates in two key states, Guerrero and Michoacán, for failing to file expense reports for their primary campaigns.

Morena does not have formal primaries but selects candidates on the basis of opinion polls, and in any case the expenses involved were very small. Fines might conceivably be in order, but disqualification is totally unjustified, especially since no such penalty has been applied to any other party’s candidates who seem to have been guilty of similar infractions.

INE’s past record makes even more of a mockery of its claim to be an impartial monitor: under its previous name as IFE (“Federal” as opposed to “National”) it ratified the notorious fraud against AMLO in the 2006 presidential election, and in the 2012 election of Enrique Peña Nieto it ignored his blatant violation of expense limits in which it is estimated that the PRI leader exceeded the permitted amount by a factor of 13.

There is one theoretical check on INE, which is the possibility of appeal to a higher institution, the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Power (TEPJF). This higher court can and occasionally does overrule INE, and in the case of the Morena candidates it did initially rule that disqualification was an excessive punishment. However, INE rejected this ruling and reiterated its decision to disqualify, and remarkably, the supposedly superior Tribunal then ratified the disqualification.

Questioned on these arbitrary decisions, AMLO has become more and more categorical in condemnation of INE (and now TEPJF) for making undemocratic and unconstitutional decisions, and has now (in his press conferences of 28 and 29 April) made it clear that he intends (after the elections) to propose an Administrative Reform Bill to eliminate or restructure these and several other institutions which in his view were only created as smokescreens to conceal corrupt practices.²

Strange as it may seem, he argues, organisations like INE and the Mexican Institute for Transparency were created for the purpose of simulation: to give an appearance of electoral integrity and open and honest administration while in fact ensuring the opposite.

As always, the President takes a clear stand on vital issues, but seeks to avoid open conflict. On the electoral disqualifications, while condemning the decisions and expressing sympathy with popular protests against them, he called on people to avoid provocation and accept the need for Morena to obey INE and propose alternative candidates.

As on previous occasions, AMLO’s patience and astute tactics may well prove to be his opponents’ undoing. The two most important positions at stake were Morena’s candidates for State Governors in Guerrero and Michoacán, key states where support for AMLO´s Transformation is massive.

The candidates now disqualified are Felix Salgado Macedonio for Guerrero and Raúl Morón for Michoacán. Salgado Macedonio, a Morena Senator, is a controversial figure, but the relevant point is that he is very popular in Guerrero (a state with a vigorous revolutionary tradition), and Morena’s response to his disqualification was (1) to announce that its new candidate would be a woman, and (2) that of three possible female candidates, the one chosen on the basis of opinion polls was Evelyn Salgado, the former candidate’s daughter.³

In Michoacán Raúl Morón was Mayor of the state capital Morelia before becoming a candidate, and Morena has chosen as his replacement a younger man, Alfredo Ramírez Bedolla, a former member of the State Assembly.

Interestingly, when on May 4th INE announced its intention of disqualifying a third Morena gubernatorial candidate – Mónica Rangel in San Luis Potosí – the reaction was so strong, especially since only one month remained before the elections, that INE backed down two days later and limited itself to imposing fines. Nevertheless, the fines – both on the party and on Rangel personally – are very substantial and surely disproportionate.

The crisis of the opposition

The context of INE´s machinations is the crisis of the Mexican opposition. The PRI, which ran the country as a virtual one-party state for much of the 20th century, and the right-wing PAN which was allowed to alternate with PRI from 2000 onwards to give an appearance of pluralism, had made a cosy arrangement to share the fruits of neoliberal corruption, until in 2018 they could no longer prevent the victory of a popular movement for real democracy with AMLO and Morena.

PRI and PAN lack any alternative programme except defence of privilege and corruption, and despite overwhelming media dominance they have been unable to undermine AMLO’s popularity and the people’s desire for change. Despite sometimes fighting each other like rats in a sack, PRI, PAN and a couple of smaller parties have finally – as AMLO predicted – come together in an unholy alliance to oppose the 4T Transformation.

AMLO now lumps them together as “PRIAN” or indeed “PRIANRD” with reference to the small PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party) which in the 1990s was a left-wing force for change in which AMLO participated, but which later degenerated and was incorporated into the system.

Given the flagrant bias of INE and TEPJF, it is interesting to note that other institutions have begun to take action to prevent electoral infractions. The Attorney-General’s office (FGR) can investigate allegations of electoral fraud, which is now (thanks to a law passed under AMLO) classified as a serious crime with no right to bail.

The Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) of the Finance Ministry, run by Santiago Nieto, has also been very active on the anti-corruption front investigating fraudulent transactions and money laundering, and is now devoting its attention to suspicious transactions related to the elections.

In recent weeks both the FGR and the UIF have begun to investigate allegations of electoral fraud by right-wing candidates, allegations studiously ignored by INE. Thus the PRI candidate for Governor of Nuevo León, Adrián de la Garza, was discovered to be distributing cards promising payments to women voters, in other words vote-buying; the case is now under investigation by the FGR and the UIF.⁴

Similar evidence has now emerged of cards pledging payments in return for votes being used by candidates of the Citizens’ Movement (MC) which is dominant in Jalisco State; this is also under investigation by the FGR.

Right-wing candidates and their allies are also more than willing to resort to threats and violence if it suits them. The outgoing PRD Governor of Michoacán, Silvano Aureoles, has a well-earned reputation for crude insults and threats, sending very offensive text messages to Morena candidate Ramírez Bedolla and others: Morena has reported him to the FGR.⁵

Overt threats and violence point to the most serious underlying problem for Mexican democracy in areas still dominated by the old regime: links to organised crime. This above all is why judicial reform is so important, along with the new security apparatus of the National Guard.

Never lacking in barefaced effrontery, some right-wing candidates and their INE allies are now claiming persecution. Adrián de la Garza actually went to the OAS (Organisation of American States) for a personal interview with its notorious Secretary-General Luis Almagro (the same Almagro who helped promote the coup in Bolivia in 2019) to request help in “defending Mexican democracy”.⁶

When this appeal to the OAS was raised with AMLO, he responded that all electoral observers are welcome including the OAS, although “it reminds me of a song by the late Carlos Puebla”, the Cuban troubador (“Como no me voy a reír de la OEA, que es una cosa tan fea” – “How can I stop laughing about the OAS, when it is so ugly”), an anti-imperialist classic from the 1970s.⁷

There is a growing movement for fundamental reform of INE, but it will not lead to change in time to avoid conflict over the current elections; only mass popular pressure and vigilance will guarantee reasonably fair elections this June. But the INE controversy is closely linked to another key issue which has now come to a head, that of judicial reform.

Judicial reform: a crucial matter

Although AMLO has been scrupulous in respecting the constitutional division of powers, it has been obvious for decades that judicial corruption is one of the foundations of inequality, injustice, political fraud and endemic corruption in Mexico.

Time and again notorious criminals on remand or condemned for fraud, money-laundering, violence and murder have been released on legal technicalities by corrupt judges, a practice which AMLO has tried to reduce but which still continues, and will only end if there is root and branch reform.

A notorious case hit the headlines early in May when a judge ordered the release of Héctor Palma, nicknamed “El Guero” (“Blondie”) and linked to the Sinaloa cartel. The judge made the order in the early hours of Saturday May 1st, a classic device using the weekend to avoid scrutiny. Fortunately the Fiscalía (Attorney-General’s office) was alert to this and had agents ready to re-arrest him on another charge minutes after his release.⁸

This did not prevent the right-wing media from absurdly trying to blame AMLO for the release, when the truth is quite the opposite: the President commented on the matter in his press conferences on May 4th and 5th as an example of a judicial decision which was an insult against the Mexican state. What price “judicial independence” when it is used to aid and abet criminals?

An equally pernicious pattern is the abuse of legal devices (“amparos”, injunctions) originally intended to safeguard individuals, in order to protect commercial privileges and prevent implementation of progressive legislation.

A case in point is AMLO’s re-nationalisation of electricity, or to be more precise, his reassertion of national control over electric power generation and distribution. The legislation, passed in late February this year, guarantees primacy for the CFE (Federal Electricity Commission) and for public enterprise, while allowing private investment only subject to strict norms protecting the public interest and workers’ rights.

No sooner had the law been passed than Juan Pablo Gómez Fierro, judge of the Second District Court in Administrative Affairs relating to Competition, Broadcasting & Telecommunications, granted an injunction to five companies against application of the law, and “in order to guarantee fair competition” to others, decreed a general suspension of the law.⁹

That a relatively minor judge in a specialised tribunal should be able to override both Congress and the President in this way is remarkable, and it is no accident that the very same judge granted injunctions to companies seeking immunity from the Hydrocarbon (oil and gas) Law and the Mobile Telephone Law, also both recently proposed by AMLO and passed by Congress.

Gómez Fierro is the most diligent judge in defending corporate privilege but he is not alone: his colleague Rodrigo de la Peza of the First District Court also granted injunctions to 11 companies against the electric power law.

As AMLO commented, it’s open to speculation whether such judges are motivated by conservative ideology or by money, but impartial administration of justice is clearly not their priority.¹⁰

In order to overcome such flagrant abuse of the judicial power, AMLO is reliant on two key figures: Attorney-General (Fiscal General) Alejandro Gertz Maneiro, and Chief Justice Arturo Zaldívar. The Attorney-General has been busy investigating and prosecuting individual cases of corruption and human rights abuses, working to end impunity. But Zaldívar’s role is arguably even more important since it is he above all who is promoting root-and-branch reform of the judicial system as such.

Zaldívar’s four-year term as Chief Justice is due to end next year, but in view of his importance AMLO has proposed extending his term for another two years. On April 15 the Morena majority in the Senate passed an amendment to this effect as part of the Judicial Reform Bill then under discussion.¹¹

Not surprisingly, the right-wing opposition immediately objected, as did an Association of District Judges.¹² Along with reform of INE, this has become a key issue in the elections. Indeed, AMLO has been remarkably frank on the issue, declaring in his April 26 press conference that Zaldívar is an unusual example of the historic importance of key individuals such as Father Hidalgo in the Independence struggle, Benito Juárez in the great liberal Reform, and Francisco Madero in the 1910 Revolution: individual leadership (caudillismo) is not necessarily bad, he argued.

The problem with conservatives defending judicial independence, he declared, is not that judges are independent of the executive (as they should be), but that they are independent from the people and dominated by powerful private interests.

Relations with the United States

Relations with the United States are not an electoral issue as such, and both the President and Foreign Secretary Marcelo Ebrard have insisted throughout on their success in maintaining relations of respect and cooperation with Washington under both Trump and Biden.

However a serious source of tension arose early in May when a progressive journalist produced evidence that two notorious opposition organisations, “Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity” and “Article 19”, receive significant funding through the US Embassy (from the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID).¹³

A formal Diplomatic Note was immediately issued demanding an explanation and pointing out that this amounts to intervention in Mexico’s internal affairs and violates the country’s Constitution. AMLO pointed out that this is virtually promoting a coup: that coups are not just carried out by the military but can be promoted by the media and foreign interests, as happened with revolutionary President Francisco I Madero in February 1913 (whose overthrow and murder were incited by the press and the US Embassy).

However, AMLO explained that he does not think the US is promoting a coup against him, simply that they have a “mistaken practice” of financing such groups in many countries, and Mexico will not accept it: “Mexico is not a colony, it’s an independent, free and sovereign country!”¹⁴

Despite such bold and unwavering defence of sovereignty, AMLO continues to seek cooperative and productive relations on other matters. Thus on migration and refugees he has had a respectful video conference with President Biden and more recently with Vice-President Kamala Harris. In particular, both countries agree in principle that Central American migration cannot be halted or controlled by force or administrative barriers, and that promotion of development and better conditions in the region is crucial.

The Mexican President has made a specific and ambitious proposal on the subject: that his very successful agro-forestry programme Sembrando Vida (“Sowing Life”), which has brought support and hope to over 400,000 peasant families and has reforested over 1 million hectares of land in Mexico, should be extended to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

Mexico has already signed an agreement with Guatemala to implement the programme there on a limited scale; but what is now proposed is that the US should finance Sembrando Vida on a massive scale, to benefit 1,200,000 peasant farmers in Central America.

Cooperation with the US also continues in other areas: since the Trade Treaty with the US and Canada now includes labour rights, Mexico accepted a US complaint about a corrupt union election at a GM motor plant, and also lodged a complaint about agricultural migrant workers’ treatment in the US.¹⁵

The Transformation continues

Despite the restrictions imposed on AMLO by the Electoral Institute, his transformative programme continues and INE cannot prevent announcement of important decisions or agreements which were under negotiation long before the election period.

Thus on April 23 a major agreement between the government and the private sector on Subcontracting and Labour Rights was formally announced. Difficult negotiations went on for more than six months, and now Labour Secretary Luisa Alcalde and employers’ representative Carlos Salazar were able to announce the agreement which bans false subcontracting used only to deprive workers of their rights.

Companies cannot legally contract out their own employees, only specialised services which are not their main activities; any subcontractors must be registered with the Ministries of Labour and Finance within 90 days; taxes and benefits are guaranteed; there must be prompt response to any workers’ grievances; subcontracting is banned in the public sector; and profit-sharing is increased from 2.8% to 7.7%.¹⁶

Equally, diplomatic exchanges and symbolic public actions commemorating historic events are doing much to reinforce public awareness of the 4T Transformation. The visit of Bolivian President Luis Arce on March 24-25 had great significance and included his attendance at the re-enactment of the Battle of Chakan-Putum in 1517, where Mayan Indians inflicted a serious defeat on the invading Spaniards. Then on May 12-13 Dilma Roussef, ex-president of Brazil, was guest of honour and attended the commemoration of 700 years since the foundation of México-Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital which is now Mexico City.

What is at stake in the June 6 elections could not be clearer: either you are for AMLO’s 4T Transformation or you are against it. If Morena wins a clear majority in the lower house of Congress, if it wins most of the 15 State Governorships being contested and most of the hundreds of state assembly and municipal positions, then the transformation process will be accelerated.

Indeed, INE’s blatant efforts to impose censorship on AMLO and to hamstring Morena’s election campaign seems to have backfired spectacularly. But as the President never tires of repeating, only the people can guarantee democracy, and popular vigilance will be essential to ensure free and fair elections on June 6th.

David L Raby is a writer, political activist and retired academic living in Norwich (UK). Professor Emeritus in Latin American History, University of Toronto; former Senior Fellow in Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool; former City Councillor in Norwich; executive member, Venezuela Solidarity Campaign; Chair, Norwich-El Viejo (Nicaragua) Twinning Link. He can be reached at [email protected] and on Twitter @DLRaby.

In the same vein he has insisted that no-one is above the law, and not only did he succeed in getting legal approval for a public vote on possible prosecution of corrupt ex-presidents, he has now persuaded a reluctant legislature to pass a constitutional reform eliminating immunity from prosecution for sitting presidents, starting with himself.

AMLO has repeatedly proclaimed his respect for the autonomy of the justice system, starting at the top with the appointment of a highly respected independent legal expert, Alejandro Gertz Manero, as Fiscal General (Attorney-General). But prosecutions for financial and administrative wrongdoing or human rights violations are complex and time-consuming, and many Mexicans are naturally impatient to see results. Moreover, the entire justice system – like the public administration as a whole – needs reform. It is as the President says rather like “pushing an elephant”.

Also crucial to the Transformation project is insistence on sovereignty and self-determination for all nations: a key principle of foreign policy with support for progressive governments in Latin America, and above all in the defence of Mexico’s own sovereignty and freedom from interference.

AMLO and his Foreign Secretary Marcelo Ebrard have sought to cultivate cooperative but sovereign relations in all fields, including justice, with the US (and other relevant partners such as Canada and Spain). It is not surprising that some of the most important suspects wanted on charges of corruption in previous Mexican administrations have been arrested abroad: Genaro García Luna (ex-president Calderón’s head of public security) in New York, Emilio Lozoya (head of PEMEX under ex-president Enrique Peña Nieto) in Spain, and César Duarte (former Governor of Chihuahua) in Florida. But both García Luna and Duarte are US residents and therefore subject to both US and Mexican jurisdiction, while Lozoya was arrested via Interpol on a Mexican warrant and subsequently extradited back to Mexico.

The Cienfuegos Case

Much more controversial, and sensitive for Mexico, was the arrest on October 15th at Los Angeles airport of General (retired) Salvador Cienfuegos, former head of the Mexican army, on narcotics charges. Cienfuegos is not a US resident and apparently has no financial interests there, and arrived with his family as a tourist when he was suddenly arrested.

The initial reaction of many – including quite a few supporters of AMLO and the 4T Transformation – was to assume that the General was guilty and that the Mexican Government would accept the situation. They could not have been more mistaken.

There was no immediate public comment from the Mexican authorities, but in private they immediately expressed to the US Ambassador their discontent at the lack of prior consultation. Then on October 28th Mexico sent a diplomatic note on the subject, and two days later they received a communication from the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) with a 732-page file of legal documents.

Foreign Secretary Ebrard had a further conversation with US Attorney-General William Barr, and in mid-November there was a joint declaration reaffirming existing arrangements on judicial cooperation. On November 18th a US judge in New York (where the General had been taken under custody) agreed to drop charges in order for the accused to be transferred to Mexico for further investigation and possible trial in his own country.

There was of course speculation on both sides of the border that AMLO might be giving in to pressure from the Mexican military and abandoning his pledge to end impunity. But both the President and Ebrard were emphatic in saying that no-one, including the General, is above the law, and that criminal investigation of individual officers does not affect civil-military relations as a whole or the importance of the Armed Forces for the Transformation project. The Mexican Fiscal General will now take charge of the investigation.

The ramifications of this are profound. More than ever, Mexico is proclaiming its judicial sovereignty, and it has scored a notable victory in persuading the US to back down. It would be ingenuous to assume that US prosecutions of Mexican officials, even when based on sound legal grounds as in the García Luna case, have an altruistic motivation.

It is remarkable that the 732-page DEA file on Cienfuegos goes all the way back to 2013, yet no action was taken until now. As pointed out in a trenchant article by John M Ackerman, “Espionage by US authorities against Cienfuegos since 2013 was never intended to struggle against corruption or combat drug trafficking. These two issues are of no concern to the US so long as foreign governments maintain blind obedience to Washington.”¹ Rather such intelligence gathering would be aimed at obtaining compromising information with which to blackmail Mexico.

Ackerman points out that the US could have taken action against Cienfuegos during the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto who was his boss, but they had no interest in doing so given the corrupt servility of the PRI President to Washington. The decision to arrest the General this year, without any prior warning, was surely aimed at reasserting control over Mexico now that AMLO is taking measures to reclaim sovereignty.

Indeed, the issue of sovereignty has been made very explicit, not only in the successful Mexican demand for the return of Cienfuegos but in other declarations by Ebrard. In response to a journalist’s question about the possible presence of DEA officers in Mexico, the Foreign Secretary declared that any US agent must respect Mexican law and could not therefore bear arms.² This is being followed up by a legislative proposal in the Mexican Congress to regulate the activities of all foreign agents, which has already prompted a critical response from US Attorney-General William Barr who says it will “make cooperation more difficult” and favour organised crime.³ The chequered role of the DEA and other US agencies in favouring organised crime when it suits them, going back at least to the Iran-Contra affair, is not of course considered by Barr.

Domestic Justice Reform

Domestically also AMLO’s quest for justice continues to advance despite many obstacles. Mexican Attorney-General Gertz Manero has now formalised a case against Calderón’s Security Chief García Luna and a request for his extradition has been filed with US authorities, in another indication of Mexico’s determination to take responsibility for its own dirty linen.

Most important, a Constitutional Reform of the Federal Justice System has just been approved by both houses of the Mexican Congress.⁴ The product of two years’ work, it was prepared by justice department officials and then accepted by AMLO who of course had expressed his desire for such a reform ever since his inauguration (or before). Respecting judicial autonomy as far as possible (always a fine line to tread), the President did not interfere in the process other than to indicate that it must promote impartiality and professionalism, combat corruption and nepotism and guarantee equal access to justice.

Arturo Zaldívar, President of the Supreme Court, indicates that the reform will place human rights at the centre of all judicial decisions. The judicial career will be professionalised as never before: all judges must have attended a reformed Judicial College and be appointed by public examination (oposición), and not by politicians as often used to happen. There must also be gender parity in the profession.

Similar measures will improve the legal aid system; in Zaldívar’s words “We will reach all corners of the country to provide legal defence and advice of the highest quality to the marginalised, the poor and abandoned so that the poorest will not be the only ones who lose in the justice system.”

These are noble words; the hard task will be to put them into practice. It will take time and determination, but certainly the new system of judicial training and appointments should make a real difference.

In the meantime AMLO’s commitment to justice is constantly demonstrated by specific decisions announced in his morning press conferences. November 25th was the International Day to Combat Violence Against Women, and AMLO brought along several women directors of relevant programmes to report directly to the public. Leading the team was Home Secretary Olga Sánchez Cordero who spoke passionately about efforts to combat femicide and domestic abuse.⁵ She also pointed out the need to overcome corruption, bureaucratic inertia and legal obscurantism in the justice system: far too many judges relied on legal technicalities which only served to prevent authentic justice.

AMLO declared his agreement with this: the much-proclaimed “Rule of Law” should not mean just formal legality but the “Rule of Justice”. He has taken a clear stand on a number of individual cases of flagrant injustice which have been brought to his attention. A particularly moving case is that of a young man in Sinaloa framed by corrupt authorities on drugs and illegal weapons charges, and jailed for years despite new evidence in his favour and confirmation that he had been tortured; the case was brought to the press conference on December 10th (Human Rights Day) by his mother, a local journalist, who was at her wits’ end. AMLO declared he would immediately grant a pardon if he could; the very next day the young man was released, and the mother, overcome with emotion, came to thank the President.⁶

Of course such individual decisions do not change the system, and most aggrieved parties cannot get to the press conferences. But there are signs that attitudes are changing in the justice system and the entire public administration. As well as the judicial reform already mentioned, there are several initiatives in other departments that have legal and judicial implications. For example, the Fiscal Investigations Unit (UIF by its Spanish initials) of the Finance Ministry, under its outstanding Director Santiago Nieto, has been working tirelessly to expose financial wrongdoing and has greatly increased the number of bank accounts blocked or suspended for fraud or money-laundering;⁷ it works closely with the Fiscalía to bring prosecutions. Similarly the Secretary of Public Administration, Irma Eréndira Sandoval, has been working with great diligence to uncover malpractice by civil servants and refer them to the justice system.

AMLO constantly announces decisions which help to “push the elephant” of government in the right direction. Thus on December 7th he announced the appointment of women to five key positions: Economy Minister, Head of the Bank of Mexico, Federal Treasurer, Director of the National Statistical Office and Director of Merchant Marine.⁸ The wheels of justice, and of public administration, may move slowly, but they are moving, and if AMLO can really change the justice system his Transformation will indeed be a success. Moreover real justice, and real transformation, can only achieved if the country can demonstrate its sovereignty and independence. Relations with the “Colossus of the North” must be based on mutual acceptance and respect.

A History Fraught with Conflict

Mexico’s relationship with the US has been problematic ever since independence in the early 19th century and the war of 1846-48 which deprived it of more than half its territory, from Texas to California and including several other states. A pattern of intimidation and actual military invasion continued down to the early 20th century and contributed to a deep-rooted Mexican distrust, even if good relations prevailed at times.

Recent weeks have witnessed two significant anniversaries: November 20th marked 110 years since the formal beginning of the great Mexican revolution, and December 1st saw the completion of two years since AMLO’s inauguration. Although celebrations were low-key due to Covid-19 restrictions, the President emphasised his achievements in office and also made clear the importance of the revolution for Mexico and Latin America.

AMLO claims that the essential foundations of his 4T Transformation have now been laid. With an impressive array of social programmes based on the principle “For the Good of All, First the Poor”, with a reassertion of the role of the state and the public sector, with the principle of official modesty and frugality (Austeridad Republicana), with a systematic campaign to end corruption and impunity, with investment in a wide range of public works and an independent foreign policy based on national sovereignty and respect for the self-determination of all nations, the achievements are remarkable. Much remains to be done, but AMLO’s impact is clear if only from the growing hysteria of the opposition and the hostility of the media, both national and international.

As for the 1910-20 Mexican revolution, even in Latin America it is little understood, partly because it occurred well before the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions or the Chilean Popular Unity, let alone Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and other more recent upheavals. Also the lack of a vanguard party or socialist programme has led to a certain condescension on the part of the orthodox left (who ought to know better since neither Cuba, Nicaragua nor Venezuela followed the prescribed rulebook). But the Mexican revolutionary forces led by Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Villa, Alvaro Obregón and others numbered in the tens of thousands and were “the greatest popular armies in the history of Latin America, bearing dreams and injustices and transformation with their actions”⁹ The result also, while lacking in a number of ways, was a profound renewal of the second most populous country in the region.

The 1910 uprising brought to an end the 34-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, one of the first and greatest examples of neocolonial exploitation of a formally independent nation (since most of Africa and Asia were then actual colonies of European powers). Under Díaz foreign capital – primarily from the US and Britain – took control of mines and plantations on a huge scale and built railways to ship out the products. Indigenous communities lost more land than even in colonial times, rural workers were subjected to debt slavery and urban workers in mines, railways and factories were denied all rights and repressed by force.

A call to arms by a wealthy democratic idealist, Francisco I Madero, would lead to successful mass revolt, and despite much factional conflict and bloodshed Mexico achieved a new progressive Constitution in 1917. The following decades would bring a vast agrarian reform (the first in Latin America), a rural public education programme (also without precedent in the region), an advanced labour code and the 1938 oil nationalisation (described at the time as Mexico’s second independence).

AMLO has repeatedly referred to the Porfiriato – the 34-year Díaz dictatorship – as a precedent for the 36 years of neoliberalism that preceded his own victory in 2018. The corruption, the inequality and the sellout to foreign interests were indeed very similar. US interests were predominant in financing the Díaz regime, and when in 1913 Mexican conservatives organised a brutal coup against the democratic President Madero, US Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was directly involved in the coup, something of which AMLO has reminded his audience on several occasions.

After this, US intervention in the armed conflicts of the revolution was limited and in no way decisive: they occupied the port of Veracruz for six months in 1914 (paradoxically tending to favour the revolutionaries fighting the coup regime), and in 1916 General Pershing led a futile punitive expedition chasing around the mountains of Chihuahua in retaliation for a raid on a US border town by Pancho Villa.

Washington refrained from further intervention, and the reforming Mexican governments of the 1920s and 1930s were able to negotiate differences without conflict. A key factor in this was that the major socialising reforms (land redistribution, support for labour and the oil expropriation) carried out by the great President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) coincided with the administration of Franklin D Roosevelt with his New Deal and Good Neighbor Policy. FDR was without doubt the most progressive US President of the 20th century and was also preoccupied with the rise of fascism in Europe. Again, AMLO has repeatedly expressed his admiration for Cárdenas, “the president who showed most love for the common people”.

It is no accident that from the 1940s onwards the post-revolutionary Mexican regime became more conservative, more pro-capitalist and more corrupt. The one-party rule of the PRI, based on patronage and astute manipulation of the revolutionary legacy, was tolerated by Washington until the global neoliberal wave initiated with Thatcher and Reagan swept Mexico along into what AMLO calls “Neo-Porfirismo”, the modern equivalent of the privatising, plutocratic and corrupt Díaz dictatorship.

To achieve justice – social, economic and legal – after 1910 required a decade of armed struggle in which hundreds of thousands died in Mexico’s third great transformation (the first being Independence from Spain and the second, the Liberal Reform of the 1850s-1860s). AMLO’s aim is to achieve justice once again with a Fourth Transformation, but one which is to be peaceful and democratic: an extraordinary challenge requiring exceptional political skill, mass popular support and a relationship with Washington based on respect, restraint, and sovereignty.

David L Raby is a writer, political activist and retired academic living in Norwich (UK). Professor Emeritus in Latin American History, University of Toronto, and former Senior Fellow in Latin American History, University of Liverpool. Former City Councillor in Norwich. Executive member, Venezuela Solidarity Campaign; Chair, Norwich-El Viejo (Nicaragua) Twinning Link. He can be reached at [email protected] and on Twitter @DLRaby.

Having signally failed over the past few months to destabilise the country by violent protests in Mexico City, the opposition has now reverted to an earlier tactic of fomenting regional discontent through an alliance of right-wing governors who claim to be defending their states against authoritarian centralism. They have seized on issues ranging from the Mexico-US water treaty to Covid-19 policy and fiscal redistribution to raise the banner of what in the US would be called “States’ Rights”, calling themselves the “Federalist Alliance”.

Corruption and machine politics

A motley crew of ten governors from the North and Centre-West, five are from the traditionally conservative PAN party, two from the old establishment PRI that ran the country for decades, one from the formerly left-wing PRD, and two independents. What they have in common is a desire to maintain traditional machine politics and prevent democratic change, and most of them are under suspicion of corruption with possible links to organised crime.

Under the leadership of Enrique Alfaro of the major western state of Jalisco they went on the offensive in May-June 2020,¹ but were stopped in their tracks when AMLO visited several of their states with his security team (the Public Security, Defence, Navy and National Guard commanders) and obliged them to accept federal policy on combatting corruption and organised crime. AMLO’s insistence on avoiding brute force and fighting violent crime by intelligence gathering and stricter financial regulation to prevent money laundering has begun to undermine their patronage networks, and may expose them to criminal charges.

Wherever possible AMLO tries to avoid open confrontation, and so insists that while having “differences of opinion” he manages to work with opposition governors. He also points out that their hostile statements are often motivated by electoral politics, since gubernatorial and legislative assembly elections are coming up in several states next June.

While there is some truth in this, the underlying issue is opposition to AMLO’s “4T” Transformation with its emphasis on ending corruption and impunity and prioritising the poor and excluded. In Mexico governors, like presidents, cannot be re-elected, so these opposition governors are concerned with defending their partisan and group interests rather than their personal hold on office. What is at stake is an entire repressive and exploitative system, and most Mexicans are well aware of this: opinion polls indicate 60 to 70% popular support for AMLO in the states run by these demagogues.

All of AMLO’s welfare and popular development programmes are based on direct transfer of federal resources to individuals and local communities, bypassing corrupt intermediaries in state and municipal bureaucracies or unions and NGOs. This has proved extremely popular with working people who were used to seeing most of the (inadequate) funds of previous social and welfare programmes disappear into the pockets of sleazy middlemen.

The “federalists” went on the offensive again on October 25th by holding public rallies in their states to attack federal policies and claim that they were being short-changed by the central government. AMLO’s response was to demonstrate, with detailed information presented by the Finance Minister, that they have received every penny they are owed under the law which was last revised in 2007 and agreed by all parties.²

The opposition governors dramatically threatened to “break the Federal Pact” – as if they were going to declare independence – something no-one takes seriously and which has no real popular support.

But such irresponsible brinkmanship caused inevitable concern, and on October 28th a pro-unity, pro-AMLO statement was issued by seven progressive governors led by Mexico City Head of Government Claudia Sheinbaum: this unconstitutional threat, they said, only shows that the “federalists” have failed to understand that Mexico has a popular mandate for change, for a peaceful transformation to end the regime of corruption and privilege.³

The pro-transformation governors are from the Centre and South, with one significant exception: the Governor of the north-west border state of Baja California. Support for AMLO and the 4T is certainly stronger in the Centre and South which are poorer, more heavily indigenous and traditionally neglected.

But support for AMLO and the Transformation is growing in the North and West, and in little more than six months’ time the regional elections may well seriously weaken the right-wing “federalists”. That is why they, who never uttered a word of dissent under the high-handed and corrupt previous president Enrique Peña Nieto, are now suddenly making populist and separatist threats.

AMLO stands firm on Mexico’s energy sovereignty

Free trade with Mexico’s northern neighbours specifically excluded the energy sector – oil, gas and electric power generation – where AMLO reaffirmed public control through PEMEX (the national petroleum company) and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE in its Spanish acronym).

While not directly nationalising companies which had entered the sector during the privatising neoliberal era, AMLO declared there would be no more giveaway deals for foreign energy giants, and corrupt former deals would be investigated for possible fraud.

On October 22nd six US senators and 37 representatives wrote to Trump complaining about Mexican policy impeding market access and going against the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement.⁴ This however is not the case as Mexico had taken care to exclude the energy sector from the treaty, and AMLO proclaimed this very publicly in front of President Trump at the White House in July.

AMLO gave a categorical response on October 26th: “I am paid to protect the public interest, not to help Repsol” (a Spanish company favoured by the previous government), and he boldly reasserted national sovereignty by referring to the historic nationalisations of oil by Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938 and of electricity by Adolfo López Mateos in 1960.⁵ He quoted Cárdenas to the effect that anyone giving away the country’s resources was “a traitor”.

It would, however, be quite wrong to conclude from this that AMLO is seeking confrontation with Washington. In recent weeks he also faced a difficult internal problem arising from an opportunistic stance by the right-wing Governor of Chihuahua State, Javier Corral, who demagogically tried to whip up nationalist sentiment against sharing scarce water supplies with the US.

The waters of the Rio Grande or Rio Bravo (the great border river) and its tributaries are shared under a 1944 treaty which took many years to negotiate and is remarkably favourable to Mexico, which receives over 75% of the water. If Mexico had defaulted on this it would undoubtedly have ended up with a worse deal, as well as getting caught up in a diplomatic row in the middle of the US election campaign. Despite violent protests provoked opportunistically by Corral and his conservative PAN party, AMLO stood firm and negotiated a solution with the US.

Direct benefits for the people

The fact of the matter is that the 4T Transformation is going full steam ahead, hence the consternation of the opposition. A controversial issue in recent weeks has been AMLO’s determination to abolish over 100 fideicomisos (trusts or “quangos”) which administered a vast range of programmes providing grants for the arts, sport, education, research, community groups and other activities. They took federal funds for all kinds of good causes, but AMLO insisted that the great majority of them were profoundly corrupt, dispensing patronage without accountability.

Abolition of these quangos was one of the President’s campaign promises, but it became a live issue in the past three months when he pushed for Congress to pass legislation on the subject. All kinds of distinguished individuals in culture, sport, academic research and charitable causes raised an indignant outcry, claiming that their worthwhile, indeed essential, activities would be abandoned.

AMLO however insisted that all worthwhile activities would continue to be supported with direct federal grants, and appointed several distinguished specialists to investigate all the relevant programmes and ensure their continuation in a more transparent and accountable manner. After a very heated debate Congress passed the law establishing a process to abolish these quangos and replace them with more transparent arrangements.

Then in recent press conferences AMLO surprised his audience by announcing his intention to halt fraudulent outsourcing or subcontracting, which is used in Mexico (as in the UK and elsewhere) to deprive workers of legitimate rights and benefits. He pointed out that many workers were dismissed from regular jobs in November and transferred for a couple of months to skeleton subcontracting firms as temporary employees, then re-hired in January or February by their real employers. In this manner they were deprived of the Christmas bonus (which is a substantial benefit to which full-time employees are entitled) and also lost seniority and accompanying benefits.

The President quoted the example of one such outsourcing company with more than 200,000 workers on its books in what also amounts to false accounting, a practice under serious investigation by Public Administration Secretary Irma Sandoval and the Tax Administration section (SAT) of the Finance Ministry.⁶ Many companies guilty of tax evasion and/or false accounting have already been taken to court or forced to pay up, in many instances for the first time ever, and this new law will lead to more such cases.

Secretary of Labour Luisa María Alcalde explained that the new law will ban outsourcing of the principal activity of any enterprise; outsourcing of specialised activities (e.g. cleaning for a manufacturing company) will be permitted but under controlled conditions; and there will be greater sanctions for companies breaking the law. She declared “We start from the principle that labour is a right and not a commodity”.⁷

Another legal reform just announced concerns housing credits: the Institute for the Promotion of Workers’ Housing (INFONAVIT), a savings scheme somewhat similar to a Building Society in the UK, will make credit available on easier terms and without intermediaries.⁸ Those approved for credit can undertake self-build projects, purchase or repairs as they please, with technical advice to ensure safety, building standards and planning requirements. Access to housing is thus improved and small and medium enterprises are also most likely to benefit.

AMLO’s political success is based on measures that sound far from radical or revolutionary, yet which in fact strike at the heart of a rotten and oppressive system. Companies are not being expropriated, there is no censorship, there are no arbitrary arrests or repressive measures (quite the contrary), but political priorities have fundamentally changed.

Proclaiming Mexico’s indigenous identity

An essential aspect of policy which has come to the fore recently (although it was always an explicit part of AMLO’s strategy) is to reclaim Mexico’s indigenous heritage and identity. He declared that 2021 will be a special year of commemoration with a series of historic anniversaries: 700 years from the foundation of the Aztec capital Tenochtitlán, 500 years since the fall of the city to the Spanish Conquistadors, 200 years from the formal completion of Mexican Independence, and several other significant events.⁹

A series of commemorations will be held during the year with guests invited from all over the world, and the emphasis will be on the indigenous cultures as the essence of national identity. Diplomatic efforts are being made to obtain the return, at least temporarily, of national treasures such as the Aztec and Mayan codices (pictographic records of the history & culture of the native peoples) and Moctezuma’s ceremonial head-dress, items currently held in various European museums.¹⁰

Discussions have been taking place about a possible formal apology by Spain for its actions in the Conquest. AMLO has pointed out that the Catholic Church made such an apology in relation to Bolivia, and hopes it may do the same for Mexico. It would be desirable also for the Church to apologise for its treatment of the Mexican independence leaders Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos, both Catholic priests and both defrocked and excommunicated before execution (although Morelos’ excommunication was subsequently withdrawn).

Along the same lines, AMLO declared that the Mexican State requests forgiveness from the native peoples, especially the Yaquis of Sonora and the Mayans, for their mistreatment by national governments during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

In keeping with this, AMLO placed great emphasis on the traditional festival of “the Day of the Dead”, really three days of communion with each family’s ancestors on October 31st and November 1st and 2nd. Coinciding with the Catholic festivals of All Saints’ Day and All Souls’ Day, it also has deep indigenous roots, and AMLO stressed this as never before by inviting 20 different indigenous nations to set up their own displays in the National Palace, where he accompanied them in a profoundly moving ceremony. In view of the ongoing Covid-19 problem, these dates were also dedicated to all those whose lives have been lost in the pandemic.

Recognition of native peoples is not limited to symbolic measures. Educational programmes being delivered during the pandemic online, on TV and by radio are available in 20 indigenous languages as well as Spanish, and several of the federal welfare programmes such as pensions are provided on more generous terms for indigenous communities. For the first time also, Afro-Mexican communities, significant in coastal areas of Veracruz, Guerrero and Oaxaca, have received official recognition; and AMLO has apologised to Chinese-Mexicans who were subject to racist attacks during the revolution. More than ever, the country’s diversity is being recognised and celebrated.

David Raby is a writer, political activist and retired academic living in Norwich (UK). Professor Emeritus in Latin American History, University of Toronto, and former Senior Fellow in Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool. Former City Councillor in Norwich. Executive member, Venezuela Solidarity Campaign; Chair, Norwich-El Viejo (Nicaragua) Twinning Link. he can be reached at [email protected] and on Twitter at @DLRaby.

The Mayan Train is designed to make a great loop round the Yucatán peninsula, through the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán and Quintana Roo. It is meant to provide an alternative to road and air transport for both goods and passengers, its construction should generate over 80,000 jobs, and it should provide economic benefits to the entire region.

But opponents say it is environmentally destructive, will expropriate community lands and infringe on indigenous rights. They claim it will promote harmful patterns of development with industries like tourism and logging. Several environmental, indigenous and human rights organisations have taken legal action with amparos (stays of execution) against all or part of it, and numerous Mexican and foreign intellectuals have signed declarations condemning it. The much-respected Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), the grassroots indigenous rebel group, has also condemned it.

How then can a progressive leader like AMLO favour such a project? How can his Fourth Transformation (4T) plan (for Mexico’s fourth great change after Independence from Spain, the Liberal Reform of the 1850s-60s and the 1910-20 Revolution) include such a harmful mega-project?

The train project explained

It’s important first of all to understand exactly what the Mayan Train proposal is. Most of the route follows the tracks of a former railway, the Ferrocarril del Sureste (Railway of the Southeast) begun in the late 1930s by the great popular reforming President Lázaro Cárdenas and his Secretary of Communications and Public Works, Francisco J Múgica. Decades later this pioneering project was abandoned and left to rot by neoliberal governments, but the track has remained public property, so the amount of community or private lands affected by the new project is relatively small.

Other local railways existed in the southeastern region from the early 20th century but had all been abandoned by the 21st century except for one which was virtually falling apart. Transport within the region and connections to central Mexico are therefore by road or air, with an ever-increasing destructive environmental impact.

It is true that most of the Yucatán peninsula is a low-lying limestone platform with a very sensitive ecological balance. Despite abundant rainfall, water drains away quickly through the porous limestone, hence the existence of a number of sink-holes known as cenotes which have had symbolic significance for Mayan culture for centuries.

This however has not prevented development of towns, cities, agriculture and communications, beginning with the great Mayan centres themselves (Chichén Itzá, Tulum, Uxmal, Palenque), continuing with monumental Spanish colonial cities (Mérida, Campeche, Valladolid) and modern centres like Cancún. The latter is in many ways an example of how not to develop the region, but the solution is not to halt all development, rather it is to combine the best of today’s technology (rail transport being an excellent example) with investment in sustainable communities.

The Director of the Mayan Train project is Rogelio Jiménez Pons who is also Director of FONATUR, the National Tourism Foundation. This in itself is enough to raise eyebrows in some quarters, but Jiménez Pons has a professional background in architecture and planning and is passionate about the Mexican Southeast.

The region, he says, has been abandoned by governments and pillaged by private interests. Since the 19th century logging and plantation agriculture have devastated much of the Yucatán peninsula, and in recent decades intensive commercial agriculture and stock-raising with no real controls on toxic inputs and waste disposal has made matters worse. In the words of Jiménez Pons, “The destruction of extensive natural areas of our country is due to the failure of the state to provide an alternative to enable people to make sustainable use of the wealth that surrounds them”.¹

The new railway will provide an environmentally-friendly alternative to road and air transport, not only for tourists or business travellers from central Mexico and overseas but also for local people. The official website points out that the region suffers from an unusual concentration of activities in a few urban centres, on average 320 km apart. The train will help to remedy this, with a total of 19 major and 13 minor stations, and fares will be graduated to provide cheap travel for Mexicans and above all for locals.²

Construction of each section of the route is preceded by thorough ecological and archaeological surveys, and carefully-designed green overpasses are planned for local fauna. There will be well planned public and private investment in local communities around each station to encourage sustainable development and employment opportunities not just in the initial construction but in the longer term.

Tourism will certainly be the direct or indirect source of much of the employment, but it will be a much more carefully planned tourism than exists at present, with much greater economic and social benefits for local people. Moreover since most of them will be benefiting from the AMLO government’s social programmes (universal health care, decent old age pensions, scholarships for students, apprenticeships under the “Young People Building the Future” scheme, the “Sowing Life” agroforestry project, loans on easy terms to small enterprises, etc), they will be much better equipped to choose constructive options and avoid exploitation.

A chorus of condemnation

Southeastern Mexico, and above all the State of Chiapas, has for decades been the centre of attention for all the wrong reasons: environmental destruction, seizure of land by commercial interests, repression of indigenous communities, political corruption and human rights violations. Hence the emergence here of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) rebel movement in January 1994 in opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Although armed action by the EZLN was very limited, it was met with brutal repression by the PRI governments of the time. Its vision of grassroots democracy and local autonomy inspired by indigenous culture had a massive initial impact across Mexico and indeed internationally. The anti-globalisation movement of the 1990s saw Chiapas as emblematic of its values.

The EZLN was among the first organisations to denounce the Mayan Train project; following a meeting to celebrate its 25th anniversary it declared on 1st January 2019 “We are going to fight…we are not going to allow (López Obrador) to bring his destructive projects here”, specifically the Mayan Train and the National Guard.³

Exactly a year later this position was repeated with typical colourful rhetoric by Subcomandante Moisés: “The capitalist hydra…with this mega-project the beast will swallow in one mouthful entire villages, mountains and valleys, rivers and lakes, men, women, boys and girls.”⁴

Where the EZLN led, much of the anti-globalisation, environmentalist and anarchist or communitarian left followed, and NGOs and anthropologists also jumped on the bandwagon. One of the most comprehensive condemnations of the project came from a highly-regarded progressive intellectual, Luis Hernández Navarro. In an article in La Jornada, Mexico’s best independent newspaper, he condemned the train project as a manifestation of “savage capitalism” which robs the native people of land and territory, destroys the environment, exploits migrant and native labour, “favours the introduction of pig ‘factories’, allows the production of genetically-modified soya and hothouse crops using large amounts of toxic chemicals, and turns a blind eye to the clearing of the forest”. He adds that drug trafficking, criminality and prostitution are central to this model, and all these evils will only grow with the Mayan Train, whatever the good intentions of the government.⁵

A similar categorical statement was made on July 30th 2020 by numerous academics in anthropology and environmental studies. “Observations on the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Mayan Train” alleged that the project would cause “serious and irreversible harm”, and was signed by researchers from 65 Mexican institutions and 26 from Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Spain, France, Switzerland and the US.⁶

Irrelevance, distortion and vested interests

So comprehensive are these critiques that it appears inconceivable that anyone remotely progressive could ever defend the train project. It would seem that the railway will cause or aggravate every evil associated with neoliberal capitalism.

But a well-informed and balanced examination of the project shows that most of these criticisms are exaggerated, inaccurate or irrelevant, and in some cases reflect hostile vested interests.

The idea that the new railway will destroy virgin tropical forest is without foundation: most such forest was destroyed long ago by commercial logging and farming interests. Local indigenous communities lost their land or were left with marginal bush, swamps and gullies where they could barely eke out an existence, so their poverty forced them either to work for starvation wages for the elite, to migrate to the tourist cities or themselves to join in destructive logging and commercial farming.

A study of three municipalities (similar to US counties), Bacalar, Calakmul and Othon P Blanco, shows that their total forestry loss 2000-2018 was 2,641 square km or about 9% of their land area; loss due to the railway will be about 4 square km or 0.02%,⁷ without including substantial reforestation of surrounding areas which is part of the project.

A Yucatecan anthropologist exposes the myth of a paradise of virgin forests with abundant wild animals and untouched Mayan communities farming their traditional lands with an unspoilt culture, now threatened by the railway:

“…the ancestral territories were lost centuries ago, [the farming communities]produce less and less due to the droughts of recent years, they find themselves obliged to migrate to the tourist areas or elsewhere to find work…We find forests devastated by clandestine logging and poachers who even start fires to drive out the game…highways where heavy lorries travel at great speed and run down animals.”⁸

In this context, she points out, the train promises natural overpasses for local fauna, a budget for protection and conservation, and decent employment and training for young people so they do not have to engage in poaching, logging or organised crime. –

“The local inhabitants are clear about one thing: paradise hasn’t existed for many years, and we cannot go on doing nothing about the situation. If transformation is what the government is offering, then that’s what has to be our hope, not a blind hope but working together and keeping an eye on it so that things work out for the benefit of the people.”

Another crucial point is that most of the objectors do not live near the route of the railway. The great majority of the academics who signed the declaration against the Environmental Impact Assessment are based in central Mexico or abroad. Even those associated with the Zapatistas are based in the Chiapas highlands, at least 100 km away from the nearest section of the route.

As for the Zapatistas themselves, contrary to the vision of many global activists the EZLN does not represent the majority of Mexico’s indigenous peoples: it has a real popular base among the Tseltal and Tsotsil Maya of the Chiapas highlands, but elsewhere in the country its support is limited to a few isolated groups and intellectuals. AMLO has expressed respect for its work in highland Chiapas as a form of local democracy, and is well aware of the ongoing problems of corruption and paramilitarism which plague the area and which his government is trying to deal with. But these problems have nothing to do with the Mayan train, only a very small section of which passes through Chiapas, in a lowland area bordering on Tabasco.

Those who do live close to the railway are small and medium farmers of mixed race, and the relatively few whose properties are affected have been awarded adequate compensation. AMLO pointed out that 9 of the NGOs most active in opposition to the Mayan Train (particularly in obtaining legal amparos to hold up the project) have received funding from US Foundations, to a total of $14 million US.⁹ While this is no more than circumstantial evidence, it is relevant to consider that the railway will remain Mexican state property and that construction and operating contracts have gone to several Mexican, Chinese and European firms; hostility from US interests both commercial and political is scarcely surprising.

A telling example of a misleading NGO is the CRIPX (Consejo Regional Indígena y Popular Xpujil, Xpujil Regional Indigenous & Popular Council), one of the 9 mentioned by AMLO, which in January 2020 obtained an amparo halting work on the train in Calakmul municipality, Campeche. It was later said to have only 18 members of whom only two lived in the municipality; it had also received more than $565,000 US from the Kellogg Foundation. A rival association, the Comité Pro Defensa del Tren Maya de Campeche (Campeche Committee for the Defence of the Mayan Train), claimed to represent 69 indigenous communities in Calakmul with almost 29,000 population; they alleged discrimination on the part of the local judge who granted the amparo, and went to Mexico City to appeal against the decision.¹⁰

“Mega-project” or constructive solution?

Work on the new railway is now (October 2020) going ahead fast; on the weekend of 9-11 October AMLO made formal visits to inspect progress on sections 1, 2 and 3 (of 7) and held public events along with Director Jiménez Pons, Secretary of Defence General Sandoval (recognising the contribution of military engineers), local politicians and representatives of private investors. They faced no protests and did not need unusual security arrangements since most local people seem contented, even enthusiastic.

It is worth commenting briefly on two common themes of the critics: that the railway is a “mega-project” and that it is linked to “extractivism”. There is here an ideological problem: any large scheme can be described as a “mega-project”, but blanket condemnation of all such schemes amounts to denial of the scientific and technological potential achieved by humanity.

Similarly, “extractivism” refers to extraction of resources from the Earth’s crust, in other words, mining and hydrocarbon exploitation.

Opposition to such activities has become a hallmark of popular and environmental movements opposed to the operations of mining and oil multinationals and imperialist governments. They rightly denounce the destruction of rural communities, contamination of land and water supplies, extinction of indigenous cultures and gross human rights abuses which often accompany such activities.

But all human societies have exploited natural resources and developed projects for their collective benefit with the technology available to them. The greater and more sophisticated the technology, the greater the potential for good, and for harm. This imposes enormous responsibility on governments, enterprises, scientists and communities, but to condemn all major projects is surely nihilistic and futile.

The urgent need in Southeast Mexico (and indeed throughout the world) in the face of the climate emergency and aggressive imperialist interests, is to develop effective community-based solutions to real problems, environmentally sustainable but also meeting the economic, social and cultural needs of local people.

Critics of the Mayan Train have ignored, often intentionally, its comprehensive efforts to address the environmental, social, economic and cultural problems of the region, and to do so with real popular participation. Director Jiménez Pons is categorical about its priorities: “The Mayan Riviera [Cancún etc] removed the original inhabitants and created a speculative process for the middle class…It is fundamental that we recognise the right to the land of the original peoples. They should maintain ownership but with the opportunity to be involved in development – the surplus value should be theirs.”¹¹

In addition to several consultations with local indigenous groups, from October 2019 to February 2020 the train administration along with FONATUR and the Ministry of Education undertook a diagnostic study of the local community organisation and economy, with 13 participatory workshops involving more than 60 communities.

The workshops carried out detailed research and produced multiple specific proposals to develop social enterprises to benefit communities and strengthen the internal market. They included agriculture, stock-raising, fishing, beekeeping, manufacturing, trade, tourism and culture, and educational and training requirements.¹² No wonder most local people welcome the Mayan Train and have little time for critics who offer no constructive alternative.

Mexico under AMLO has banned fracking and open-cast mining. It is trying to promote self-sufficiency and sovereignty in power supplies, technology and agriculture. Its efforts to develop efficient non-polluting transport infrastructure include new metro and light rail lines in the major cities, 500 new trolleybuses for Mexico City, new inter-city railways from the capital to Toluca and Querétaro, a major railway in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec – and above all, the Mayan Train. This surely reflects a creative vision using technology to benefit the entire nation and its people.

David Raby writes: In Mexico President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has insisted from the beginning that his Fourth Transformation (4T) will be peaceful and democratic. Even while courting criticism by using the military for assistance in delivering social programmes and public works, and setting up a National Guard with military direction (for the first five years) for public security, he has nevertheless gone to remarkable lengths to avoid using violence or repression except against hardened criminals. Indeed, even against organised crime he has prioritised intelligence over brute force.

Opposition Governors are Brought to Heel

The opposition, which has coalesced in recent months around a group of conservative and/or corrupt State Governors, tried to take advantage of this by focussing on problems of organised crime and implying that AMLO is neglecting the problem. They have also used his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, based on persuasion rather than compulsion for public compliance, to criticise federal policy and use coercion to promote an image of strength in their own states.

One key area of opposition strength is the west-central Bajío region including the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato and Colima. It is also an area where organised crime is very active: the major drugs gang at the moment is the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and a rival outfit, the Cartel Santa Rosa de Lima, is based in Guanajuato. As I explained in a previous article¹, these cartels have recently been involved in several spectacular acts of violence which the media regard as a serious challenge to AMLO´s public security strategy.

The governors of these states gave the impression of wanting to pursue the old strategy of hard-line confrontation with the cartels, a policy which had led to much innocent blood being shed under President Felipe Calderón of the PAN (2006-12). At the same time there is widespread suspicion that they may in fact have corrupt links to the very cartels they claim to combat, and indeed Calderón himself is now under suspicion in this regard.

This scenario is potentially explosive and quite dangerous for the President and his staff. It therefore came as something of a surprise when AMLO decided to visit Michoacán on June 26th, accompanied by his Secretary of Defence, General Sandoval; and then from July 15th to 17th (after his crucial trip to Washington) to visit Guanajuato, Jalisco and Colima, accompanied in all cases by General Sandoval and other members of his defence and security team. More recently he has visited other states with opposition governors in the North-West (Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora and Baja California Sur).

These visits included AMLO´s all-important morning press conferences (mañaneras) where he and members of his staff make announcements and field questions for about two hours on end. In each of the states in question, the State Governor also attended and was obliged to speak and answer questions alongside the President and his security team.

It was clear in all cases that the Governors were far from comfortable with the situation. They all expressed some disagreements with the President but were obliged to accept his insistence on dialogue and collaboration, and indeed to publicly accept working together on security strategy as laid down by the Federal Government.

AMLO tours the Bajío

In Michoacán, Governor Silvano Aureoles of the PRD (originally a left-wing party but profoundly affected by corruption) had directly criticised the role of the National Guard and the Armed Forces in general in public security. But given the poor record of his state in crime and public order, he was visibly nervous in the presence of AMLO and his security chiefs. Similarly, when questioned by journalists about eliminating excess and waste in his administration (as AMLO has done with great determination), Aureoles attempted to justify his record with dubious assertions.² He also appears to have close links to a prominent opposition online media platform, Latinus, which has been very active in attacking the President and the 4T Transformation;³ again, the Michoacán Governor was obliged to offer rather unconvincing denials of this.

Even more telling was the Guanajuato meeting on July 15th, in which the Governor, Diego Sinhué Rodríguez of the right-wing PAN, was forced to admit the error of his ways. AMLO has daily meetings of his security team at 6 am (before the 7 am press conferences), and all state governors are encouraged to participate online, but Governor Sinhué in December 2019 publicly refused to do so.

On July 15th Sinhué declared that he had changed his mind and had begun to participate ten days earlier, and had agreed to accept federal security strategy “for the sake of the security of the guanajuatenses”⁴ (the state’s appalling homicide rate made the need for this patently obvious). Sinhué (who is nearing the end of his term), along with his PAN predecessors, is widely suspected of collusion with organised crime and thus of direct responsibility for the violent chaos in Guanajuato, but it seems he has now met his match.

The next day, July 16th, a similar drama was played out in Jalisco, home to Mexico’s second city Guadalajara and with another right-wing governor, Enrique Alfaro of the “Citizens’ Movement”. Alfaro is regarded as the unofficial leader of the alliance of some 10 or 11 opposition governors, and had openly challenged the President some six weeks earlier over problems of popular protests and repression in Jalisco.⁵

The tension at this press conference was palpable, and there was a thinly-veiled confrontation in the speeches of AMLO and Governor Alfaro. But it was Alfaro who looked nervous and was visibly sweating, and who was directly challenged not just by the President but by several journalists, including two brave young women from local media who confronted him over repression by state forces. Despite his hostile attitude Alfaro was forced to recognise the need for change in the state Attorney-General’s office and to accept federal investigations into human rights issues.⁶

The third governor to be put on the spot in this remarkable presidential tour was José Ignacio Peralta of Colima, a small Pacific coast state bordering on Jalisco and home to Manzanillo, Mexico’s largest port. On July 17th Governor Peralta, like his colleagues in Guanajuato and Jalisco, expressed differences with the President over some issues, but equally had to accept federal security policy.

But the biggest blow for Peralta came when AMLO announced that administration of all of the country’s ports was being taken over by the Navy in order to end smuggling and corruption, and that customs administration was also being completely overhauled at all ports of entry, maritime, terrestrial and air. “Who ran the customs?” asked AMLO rhetorically: “The politicians!”, and he explained how running the customs service of a port had been a handy money-spinner for many sleazy operators.⁷ Peralta (a member of the PRI) put on a brave face as he tried to hide his discomfort.

Recent events have further vindicated AMLO’s intelligence-led security strategy and demonstrated the vulnerability of corrupt governors. On August 2nd the boss of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, El Marro, was captured along with five associates in a skilful operation headed by a military Special Forces unit, with scarcely a shot being fired.⁸ Although for both legal and political reasons members of the State Attorney’s office took part, the key to the operation was intelligence coordinated by AMLO’s security chief Alfonso Durazo.

In terms of military force no chances were taken, with 120 Special Forces personnel and another 120 federal troops engaged in the operation, but the decisive action which involved the simultaneous seizure of four of the Cartel’s “safe houses” produced only one casualty, one of El Marro’s bodyguards who was wounded in the leg. A similar operation under previous administrations would probably have featured troops going in with all guns blazing and dozens of casualties, many of them innocent. El Marro was held at a State Penitentiary for initial interrogation and then transferred four days later, under heavy guard, to a Federal Gaol in Mexico State.

Members of the PAN in the Federal Congress initially tried (on Twitter) to credit their colleague Governor Diego Sinhué with the operation, but they were so ill-informed that they confused El Marro with the boss of the rival Jalisco Cartel, El Mencho. More important, as pointed out by independent journalists, is that Sinhué had five years to deal with El Marro and had done nothing, presiding over the near-quadrupling of homicides in Guanajuato from 600 in 2015 to 2,261 in 2019.⁹

Even ex-Presidents are No Longer Safe

Of course Mexican governments always claimed to combat corruption, but it is significant that under President Carlos Salinas in 1994 corruption ceased to be classified as a “serious crime” under the criminal code; and as AMLO pointed out, the “Anti-Corruption Institute” subsequently created was “pure simulation”.¹⁰ Under the present administration it has once again been classified as a serious crime. The national anti-corruption campaign has advanced dramatically in the last two months on the legal front, with prominent former politicians and officials facing charges from the Attorney-General’s office (Fiscalía) and/or being sought for extradition back to Mexico from the US, Spain and Canada.

Such extraditions would have been almost inconceivable until recently when it was only Mexicans who were extradited (usually to the US), but the strengthening of judicial independence and the rule of law, and the forging of a relationship of mutual respect and institutional cooperation with the US and other powers has transformed the situation. With a Fiscal-General, Alejandro Gertz Manero, of unquestioned integrity and a remarkably efficient and professional Foreign Secretary in Marcelo Ebrard, AMLO´s Government is gaining unprecedented international respect and practical results.

The most spectacular case is that of former PEMEX boss Emilio Lozoya, who spearheaded the privatising “Energy Reform” under President Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI (2012-18) and who has just been extradited to Mexico from Spain.¹¹ Subject to serious corruption charges himself, he has been given the status of “collaborating witness” subject to reduced penalties in return for spilling the beans on gross corruption at the highest level.

Also spectacular, and potentially devastating for the old regime of the PRI and PAN parties, is the case of Genaro García Luna, head of security under President Calderón and currently on trial in New York on corruption and narcotics charges. The case against García Luna has advanced rapidly due to cooperation by the Mexican authorities, and seems likely to implicate Calderón himself in responsibility for collusion with the Sinaloa Cartel.

Other cases that have come to light recently are that of the former Governor of Chihuahua State, César Duarte of the PRI, under arrest in Florida on corruption charges and now requested in extradition by Mexico; and that of the former head of Mexico’s Criminal Investigation Agency, Tomás Zerón de Lucio, under suspicion in relation to the 2014 Ayotzinapa massacre of 43 students, and currently living in Canada.

Returning to the case of Emilio Lozoya, he was detained in Málaga, Spain in February 2020 on an Interpol warrant after being on the run for some time; five months later his extradition was approved and he arrived back in Mexico on July 17th. He is in hospital in the State of Mexico but under arrest and has already made formal declarations to the Fiscalía,¹² relating in particular to the notorious Odebrecht scandal in which the Brazilian engineering firm of that name has been shown to have bribed politicians in several Latin American countries.

Mexico was one of the few countries where the Odebrecht affair had not yet caused heads to roll, but Lozoya has revealed million-dollar payments which he says were used to finance Enrique Peña Nieto’s 2012 election campaign and to bribe Mexican Congress members to pass the privatising “Energy Reform” in 2014. His testimony includes colourful details about huge amounts of cash held in safes at a house in the luxury Lomas de Chapultepec district and handed over in person to politicians for their cooperation. His revelations also relate to purchase by PEMEX of a fertiliser plant at a highly inflated price (some $200 million US above market value).¹³

In all these cases AMLO has insisted on the independence of the Fiscalía, unlike the former Procuraduría which was subordinate to the President. Due legal process must be followed, but what matters is (1) that the truth be known; (2) there must be punishment and not impunity; and (3) the proceeds of crime must be recovered as far as possible for the benefit of the nation.¹⁴

Worst of all, in AMLO’s view, was the cynical attitude which predominated, assuming that no politician worth his salt would fail to profit from office, and that even those few who were convicted of graft did not lose their respectability. This cynicism was accompanied by the offensive view that corruption was part of Mexican culture, an idea that AMLO rejects vehemently.

An entire corrupt system is on trial

So far those on trial or under arrest and interrogation are former ministers or secretaries of state, or bosses of institutions like PEMEX, which is already an indictment of corruption at high level. But the most prominent cases now under way are a direct threat to two ex-presidents, Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto. At present Peña Nieto has not said a word, but Calderón has been very vocal both in general political attacks on AMLO and in claiming that he is subject to political persecution. But as AMLO has pointed out more than once, if Calderón feels aggrieved he should complain to the judge in New York, since the evidence against him comes primarily from the trial of García Luna, his former Secretary of Public Security now detained in a high-security prison in Brooklyn and implicated in receiving multi-million-dollar bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel.

As things stand the Constitution prevents putting ex-presidents (or the serving President) on trial except for High Treason or “serious crimes”; AMLO tried to remove this immunity but Congress did not accept the reform. It may well be that evidence emerging in the García Luna and Lozoya cases might establish a legal basis for charges of “serious crimes” against these two ex-presidents; there is good reason to suspect that both of them were up to their necks in sleaze and graft, and many of AMLO’s popular supporters would love to see them in gaol.

But the implementation of such verdicts would threaten the entire pre-2018 political establishment and could well precipitate a dramatic confrontation. AMLO is well aware of this and has repeatedly declared that he is not in favour of punishing ex-presidents: the facts should be known, their guilt should be established before the court of public opinion, “but we do not want to set the country on the road to rupture” and “we are not going to persecute anyone”.¹⁵ What is at stake is a matter of policy, to expose corruption through due legal process, to ensure that it is seen as unacceptable and that it will not occur again. If a legal case against any ex-president is to be brought, AMLO argues there should be a popular vote on whether to go ahead, and says that he himself would oppose such action although he would respect the result of a vote.

This however does not mean abandonment of serious legal investigations, and in his August 14th press conference AMLO made it clear that if they are implicated by Lozoya’s testimony, both Peña Nieto and Calderón should be required to testify, even if only in writing. Moreover, their testimony should be made public because it is “a matter of State” that the full sordid truth be known in order to banish corruption in future. Furthermore, such investigations should not be limited to the last two presidents but should apply to all holders of the supreme office in the neoliberal period, starting with Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94).¹⁶

The stakes are very high, not least because in the meantime the 4T Transformation continues and positive achievements are announced almost every week: a coordinated plan for schools to resume classes very soon but through distance education, including a formal agreement for the major private TV channels to help by showing public educational programmes arranged with the Education Ministry; control of the ports and the customs administration by the Navy to end corruption there; guaranteed Mexican access to a Covid-19 vaccine being developed by Oxford University and AstraZeneca on a not-for-profit basis, with Mexico and Argentina responsible for manufacture and distribution throughout Latin America; and creation of a single public agency for purchase and distribution of all pharmaceuticals.

David Raby is a writer, political activist and retired academic living in Norwich, UK. Professor Emeritus in Latin American History, University of Toronto, Canada; former Senior Fellow in Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool (UK). Former City Councillor in Norwich. Executive member, Venezuela Solidarity Campaign; Chair, Norfolk & Norwich El Viejo (Nicaragua) Twinning Link. He can be reached at [email protected] and on Twitter @DLRaby.

As a candidate in 2017 AMLO had called Trump a “neofascist” and roundly condemned his anti-Mexican prejudices. Trump threatened to tear up NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, and while AMLO like much of the Mexican Left had condemned this neoliberal treaty, it seemed likely to be replaced with something even worse if Trump got his way.

But AMLO surprised most observers, and probably the US administration, by seeking good relations from the word go. Despite the imbalance of forces, the Mexican leader and his team correctly calculated that Washington would not really want to exclude migrant workers completely or to disrupt the closely integrated economy of the border regions and of major industrial production chains like the automobile industry.

While totally opposed to neoliberalism, AMLO realised that with 80% of Mexico’s foreign trade being with its northern neighbour the idea of simply tearing up NAFTA was a non-starter. The only viable solution (although far from easy) was to seek revision of the treaty in ways beneficial to Mexico.

Rather than indulge in futile, indeed suicidal, anti-imperialist gestures, AMLO sought to engage with the vain and irascible occupant of the White House by a combination of flattery and hard bargaining. Trump’s preference for personal dialogue and deal-making could be used to Mexico’s advantage.

On his election in 2018 AMLO contacted the US President proposing a new stage in bilateral relations “based on mutual respect”, and Trump responded in kind, with warm congratulations on AMLO’s victory. Shortly afterwards a high-level US delegation arrived to push trade negotiations forward.¹ While domestically AMLO advanced with his “Fourth Transformation” (4T) agenda, he also sought rapprochement with Mexico’s hegemonic neighbour.

Two years later, in July 2020, the inconceivable has happened: a new trade treaty (USMCA, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement) has come into force, with significant benefits for Mexico; and AMLO has just visited Washington as a favoured guest of President Trump. Moreover, despite scepticism from many on both sides of the political spectrum, this gesture may well go down in history as a triumph of Mexican diplomacy.

The Transformation of Mexican Foreign Policy

In the year and a half since his inauguration, AMLO and his remarkably capable Foreign Secretary Marcelo Ebrard have discreetly but firmly undertaken a radical reorientation of Mexican foreign policy. Rather than a supine submission to Washington and a steady rightward drift, as had been the case with the neoliberal presidents of the previous 30 years, they have reasserted Mexico’s historic tradition of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty, and combined it with an active and protagonistic role promoting peace and multilateral cooperation on the international stage.

While quietly negotiating with Washington, Mexico showed an apparently contradictory desire for closer relations with progressive governments in Latin America. Formerly a leading member of the conservative “Lima Group” of Western Hemisphere governments (formed in August 2017 to increase hostile pressure on Venezuela in line with US policy), Mexico now withdrew from the group. This new trend in Mexican policy faced a potential crisis in late May 2019, when after months of growing Central American migration through Mexico towards the US, Trump suddenly threatened to slap 25% tariffs on all Mexican products if the flow of migrants were not halted.²

Rather than respond with hostile rhetoric, AMLO called for dialogue and sent Marcelo Ebrard to Washington for talks. A week later Ebrard emerged triumphant, with a bilateral agreement to work together to manage migration from Central America (and elsewhere), and an understanding that tariffs and trade were a separate issue.³ Trump abandoned the tariff threats and trade negotiations resumed.

Another dramatic incident which demonstrated the new direction of Mexican diplomacy was the coup in Bolivia in October 2019 and Mexico’s decisive action to grant asylum to President Evo Morales, sending an air force plane to rescue him and almost certainly saving his life.⁴ Despite evidence pointing to US involvement in the coup, open friction with Washington was avoided and Mexico insisted that this was a humanitarian gesture based on its long tradition of granting asylum regardless of political orientation.

This positive engagement with Latin American neighbours is now reflected with Mexico holding the presidency of CELAC, the Community of Latin American & Caribbean States (which includes all Western Hemisphere countries except the US & Canada) for the year 2020; Mexico is clearly proud to lead this independent regional organisation. AMLO has carefully avoided any entanglement in the bitter confrontation between the US and Venezuela, but when questioned on the subject he reasserted Mexico’s opposition to any kind of intervention and its defence of national sovereignty. In response to a specific question as to whether Mexico would sell Venezuela petrol, he declared that they would (although no request had been received): “We are free, and we defend self-determination”.⁵

When the Covid-19 pandemic hit, Mexico not only took the necessary domestic measures but reached out for help internationally: Marcelo Ebrard and his team quickly arranged to get ventilators and PPE from China, and AMLO personally called both Trump and president Xi Jin-ping of China to request assistance. Beyond this, Mexico also took the lead on Covid-19 internationally, with AMLO intervening in a virtual meeting of the G20 to warn that the response to the pandemic must address the problem of global inequality.⁶

In the last three months the scope and ambition of Mexico’s diplomacy has really come into its own. At the UN the Mexican delegation proposed a resolution calling for equal access to any Covid-19 vaccine or treatment and an end to speculation in medicines and equipment; it was backed by 187 of 193 member countries. This and other activities favouring international cooperation were reflected in Mexico’s election to the Security Council with a near-unanimous vote, and its appointment also to ECOSOC, the UN Economic & Social Council.

This success on the global stage was accompanied by important steps in bilateral relations, making it clear that while Mexico wants close economic collaboration, military involvement of any kind is not acceptable. Current legal action against corruption under former president Felipe Calderón has raised the issue of the “Fast and Furious” intervention in 2009, a covert raid by armed US agents which violated Mexican sovereignty and which appears to have been authorised by Calderón’s government. Marcelo Ebrard sent a diplomatic note on May 8th requesting clarification of recent revelations on the subject.⁷

Also on June 18th AMLO reminded his audience that under former president Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-18) the US had provided helicopter gunships to help Mexico in the fight against crime, but “with all due respect, we do not want this”.⁸

To Washington with Prestige and Dignity

Global diplomatic success combined with assertion of legal and military sovereignty meant that the Mexican President could arrive at the White House with his head held high, not as a supplicant but as leader of an independent country with growing prestige. His confidence was also aided by domestic success, with progressive implementation of social programmes and systematic efforts to eradicate corruption and impunity.

The visit was not generally expected until almost the last moment: for over a year into his presidency AMLO maintained that he would not engage in international travel, relating with other heads of state by phone, virtual communication or through his diplomatic service. Even when in late March 2020 both Trump and Xi Jin-ping issued invitations, he showed reluctance to travel, citing health concerns. Still as late as June 10th, in answer to a question at his daily press conference, AMLO pointed out that the UN was advising against meetings of heads of state at the General Assembly in September, and “I still think the best foreign policy is made at home”.⁹

Anyone who has observed the Mexican President carefully will realise that he keeps his cards close to his chest, and it should not have come as a surprise that only some ten days later he was talking of the visit to Washington as a strong possibility. The formal entry into force of the new USMCA Treaty on July 1st meant that early July would be an appropriate time to visit, indeed the only realistic time given the electoral calendar in the US. Critics would in any case argue that the visit would give unnecessary backing to Trump’s campaign, but AMLO could reasonably respond – as he did – that it was a state visit celebrating a major new bilateral agreement (indeed, trilateral, with Canada) regardless of party politics.

When the visit finally materialised, AMLO’s remarkable capacity for surprise and audacity was revealed yet again in the unprecedented decision to take an ordinary commercial flight. While it was well known that he was selling the presidential plane as part of his drive against official extravagance, it had widely been assumed that he would travel in a Mexican Air Force plane for security reasons.

The event itself, from the evening of July 7th to the afternoon of July 9th, followed the choreographed ritual of most such events. AMLO made formal tributes at the monuments to Abraham Lincoln and Benito Juárez, emphasising good relations at a crucial moment in the history of both countries (the US Civil War and abolition of slavery, and the French invasion of Mexico). This in itself could be seen as a subtle but significant gesture given Trump’s association with white supremacists, made more palatable by the fact that Lincoln belonged to the Republican Party. It also marked a very rare instance in which the US actually defended Mexican sovereignty.

Following the official meeting of the two presidents on July 8th, both alone and then with their respective teams, the formal speeches in the White House Rose Garden were remarkably warm and cordial. Trump spoke of “my good friend” and said the two countries now enjoyed “an outstanding relationship…which had never been so close”, praising the contribution of Mexican-Americans in many fields of US life.

AMLO’s speech also focused on the positive, but it was longer and more substantial, with emphasis on several points which are crucial to his agenda. “We want to privilege understanding…setting aside differences, or solving those differences through dialogue and mutual respect” – “Some thought that our ideological differences would inevitably lead to confrontation. Fortunately, that bad omen was not fulfilled.” He outlined the benefits of the new USMCA trade treaty, as Trump had also done, but stressed the benefits for workers and for small and medium enterprises. He also thanked the US President for assistance in obtaining ventilators for dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic.

But AMLO also politely but pointedly stressed several historical episodes: a remark by George Washington to the effect that no nation should take advantage of another’s weakness; the close relationship between Juárez and Lincoln and the rejection of the French invasion; and the good relations also between Lázaro Cárdenas and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in avoiding conflict over the 1938 oil expropriation.

AMLO repeatedly referred to friendship and good relations between the two countries “despite some grievances which cannot be forgotten”; and “what I appreciate the most is that you have never sought to impose on us anything that violates our sovereignty…You have not tried to treat us as a colony; rather, you have honoured our status as an independent nation.”¹⁰ Not surprisingly, Trump described his visitor as “tough but fair”.

The visit concluded with a gala dinner and further brief speeches; among those attending were leading business representatives, a sign of the new treaty’s real commercial and economic significance.

Critics, allies & saboteurs: what’s really at stake

As was to be expected, the Washington visit was subject to intense criticism from all sides, but particularly from the left. Those who had denounced NAFTA as a neoliberal agreement destroying workers’ rights, depressing wages, turning Mexico into a branch-plant economy and harming the environment, saw no benefit in the new treaty. They condemned AMLO for not meeting Mexican migrants and for being a pal of Trump when the US President is struggling in the polls. A typical Mexican leftist journal, La Izquierda Diario, accused AMLO of “grovelling” with a “display of flattery” in the face of Trump’s “unlimited cynicism”.¹¹ In the US the Democrats inevitably accused the Mexican President of unwarranted interference in the election campaign, and the liberal media in both the US and Mexico rehashed all of Trump’s unsavoury qualities and the alleged benefits for Mexico of a Democratic victory in the elections.

What the critics fail to consider is that a failure to engage with the US on trade when Trump was denouncing NAFTA for his own nationalist reasons, and even more when global economic crisis threatened to see Mexico crushed by US protectionism, would have been disastrous. As for migration, open confrontation with Trump could only lead to brutal retaliation which would leave the migrant community in a much worse situation.

The new USMCA Treaty also has real benefits which the critics fail to consider. Unlike NAFTA, it includes a chapter on labour which explicitly recognises union rights, calls for internal union democracy and for higher wages in Mexico. It also includes small and medium enterprises, providing for their participation in exchanges between the three countries; and it respects Mexico’s petroleum sovereignty, previously threatened by US proposals for a free energy market. To have won these concessions from Washington is no small achievement.

But where the critics are most wide of the mark is in terms of the political context, both domestic and international. Anyone familiar with US Latin American policy in recent decades will realise that the Democrats, despite their liberal rhetoric and their much more presentable manners, are in practice no less interventionist and bellicose than the Republicans. As for migration, under Obama a record number of Mexicans – nearly two million – were deported.

In Mexican domestic politics the right-wing and old-guard opposition to AMLO has been completely outmanoeuvred by the Washington visit. They have been trying desperately to tar him with the leftist brush as an irresponsible populist, an enemy of business, a castro-chavista bent on turning Mexico into another Venezuela. Now he has most of the country’s leading entrepreneurs on side, transnational companies like Walmart agreeing to pay overdue taxes to finance the 4T Transformation, a new trade treaty and a good relationship with the most notoriously unpredictable US president in living memory.

What the Mexican right wing (and much of the US establishment) wanted was to provoke AMLO into a confrontation which would enable them to generate a middle- and upper-class revolt with significant support, leading to regime change as in Brazil or Bolivia or at least serious unrest as in Venezuela or Nicaragua. Instead they are faced with a moderate consensus for real progressive change in a democratic and peaceful manner, a positive example which can only be beneficial for the entire Latin American and Caribbean region (and even – dare one hope – for the US itself).

Viewed in this context, AMLO’s Washington visit can be seen, in the words of John Ackerman, as “a strategic triumph of reason over politics” and “a diplomatic master-stroke” comparable in US politics to Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972.¹² The more thoughtful and analytical intellectuals in Mexico realise this: Victor Flores Olea writes of “AMLO’s tour-de-force in dangerous territory” and quotes veteran Senator Porfirio Muñoz Ledo: “this is the most complete and illuminating speech I have ever heard from a Mexican president in the United States…” Muñoz Ledo also points out that “Trump didn’t say what he thinks, but what he had to say, while López Obrador said exactly what he thinks and what I believe all Mexicans think”.¹³

David L Raby is a writer, political activist and retired academic living in Norwich (UK). Professor Emeritus in Latin American History, University of Toronto, and former Senior Fellow in Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool. Former City Councillor in Norwich. Executive member, Venezuela Solidarity Campaign; Chair, Norfolk & Norwich El Viejo (Nicaragua) Twinning Link. He can be contacted at [email protected] and on Twitter @DLRaby.